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Abstract
We present a model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different
platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the cho-
sen platforms, but rather infer the candidates’ ideologies from signals made during the
campaign (debates, speeches), where a larger number of signals corresponds to a higher-
intensity campaign. This model captures two patterns: (1) the “post-primary moderation
effect,” in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to
the center in the general election; and (2) the “divisive-primary effect,” which refers to
the detrimental effect of intense primaries on a party’s general-election prospects. These
effects are obtained in spite of the fact that primary voters are forward-looking and take
into account that a more extreme candidate has a smaller chance of winning the general
election than a moderate one does.
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1 Introduction
Political primaries, an influential institution in the American political process, require
candidates to obtain a party nomination by vote in order to compete in the general
election. Two established facts about primaries are: (1) Candidates tend to pander to
the party base during primaries and moderate their platforms after securing the nom-
ination,1 and (2) Hard-fought primaries can influence a party’s chances of winning the
election.2 The first observation, “post-primary moderation,” follows from the premise
that primary voters hold more extreme political views than the general-election voters.
The second observation, the so-called “divisive primary” hypothesis, suggests that a can-
didate’s prospects in a general election may be affected by the intensity of the primary
race.
These two observations seem hardly surprising. Despite this, the theoretical litera-
ture lacks a model that can deliver both of these results simultaneously. The reason is
∗I would like to thank Andrew Schotter and Alessandro Lizzeri for the invaluable help and
encouragement they have provided during the course of this project. I thank Alex Agranov
for suggesting the idea for this paper. I also thank Alessandro Gavazza, Guillaume Frechette,
Rebecca Morton, Nicola Persico, Debraj Ray, Elliott Ash, Mark Dean, Matthew Embrey, Ofer
Setty, Daniel Martin, Chloe Tergiman, Anna Ingster, and seminar participants at New York
University for their useful comments.
1Using U.S. congressional data Burden (2001) shows that candidates adopt more extreme positions
in primaries than in general elections.
2The conventional wisdom that hotly contested primaries can damage a party’s chances in the general
election is based on the theoretical work of Key (1953). Empirical literature that studied this conjecture
produced mixed results: Abramowitz (1988), Bernstein (1977) and Lengle-Owen-Sonner (1995) find that
intense primaries hurt candidates in the general elections, Alvarez-Canon-Sellers (1995) and Westlye
(1991) find that intense primaries help candidates in the general election, Atkenson (1998) and Kenney
(1988) find that general election prospects are not affected by the primary intensity, and, finally, Born
(1981) and Hogan (2003) find mixed relationship. In this paper, we use theoretical analysis to shed
light on the relationship between the intensity of the nomination process and general election outcomes.
The mechanism studied here delivers a negative correlation, i.e., it shows that intense primaries are
detrimental to a party’s chances of winning general elections.
that most existing models use one of two extreme assumptions: either that candidates
make binding commitments to electoral platforms (as in Wittman (1983) and Coleman
(1972)3), or that announcements made by candidates are purely cheap talk (as in Alesina
(1988)). If a candidate commits to a platform, then the mere fact of commitment pre-
cludes moderation. If a candidate has no access to a commitment technology, then his
general-election prospects should not be affected by the intensity of the primary race.
In either case, a model with either of these two assumptions cannot explain both the
post-primary moderation and the effects of an intense primary race.
In this paper we develop a model of two-stage elections that captures both the post-
primary shift and the divisive-primary effect. In our model, candidates have policy pref-
erences and a partial commitment to those policies, which is captured by incorporating
costs of lying as well as by having the candidates’ platforms revealed imperfectly. Voters
are forward-looking and take into account that a more extreme candidate has a smaller
chance of winning the general election than a moderate one does. The candidates strate-
gically choose the platforms, depending on which signals are generated and observed by
the voters, and candidates’ true preferences are partially revealed through signals sent
during primary and general-election campaigns. The number of signals serves as a mea-
sure of the intensity of the race and determines how much information is transmitted in
the two-stage election process.
In equilibrium, candidates “flip-flop” by pandering to the median voter of the primary
race during the primary and then shifting to the center once the nomination is obtained.
In the primary voters elect a candidate they believe to be more extreme. The extent
to which candidates mimic each other depends on the costs of lying and the intensity
of each stage. We show that in this equilibrium an increase in the primary intensity
lowers the chances of the party holding it to win the general election. This is because
intense primaries increase the chances of moderate candidates to lose the nomination
and decrease the chances of extreme challengers to win the general election. Finally, we
demonstrate that an increase in the primary intensity may be beneficial or detrimental
for the welfare of the party holding it depending on the ideology of the incumbent.
The trade-off at the heart of the model is a classic one in political economy: the
probability of winning versus the policy outcome should you win. This trade-off is the
key idea in the work-horse models of Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985). The difference
in this paper is that this trade-off is being made by the median voter of the primary
election rather than the candidate herself. To execute the trade-off, the primary median
voter has to learn the type of candidate he is nominating. This selection problem itself
induces a trade-off: the primary median voter wants to nominate a more extreme type
(which is closer to his policy preferences) but as he learns whether a candidate is extreme
or not, so too does the general election median voter. This lowers the probability further
3Wittman (1983) studies one-stage election model with policy-motivated candidates, whereas Cole-
man (1972) investigates two-stage election model (with primaries and general elections) with office-
motivated candidates. Both models assume that at the beginning of the election candidates choose one
position, which will be implemented if they get elected.
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that an extreme nominee will win the general election both directly and indirectly. The
indirect effect is that a candidate that is strongly perceived to be extreme will pander
less to the general election median voter.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. In
Section 3 we characterize the pandering equilibrium, in Section 4 we obtain comparative
statics results, and in Section 5 we discuss welfare implications. In Section 6 we formulate
several additional implications of the model and present two extensions: one in which
both parties hold primary elections and one in which candidates’ types are drawn from
the continuous distribution. The related literature is summarized in Section 7, and,
finally, in Section 8 we offer some conclusions.
2 Model
We build upon the standard one-dimensional policy location game by Downs (1957). A
policy space is the closed interval P = [−1, 1]. There is a continuum of voters with
Euclidean policy preferences on P . A voter is identified by his ideal point zi ∈ P . The
utility of a voter zi if policy p is implemented is u(zi, p) = −|zi − p|. The position of the
median voter mPop is not known with certainty: mPop ∼ U [−a, a] with E [mPop] = 0 and
a ∈ (0, 1).
There are two parties: a left-wing party (Democrats) and a right-wing party (Re-
publicans). A member of one party is currently holding the office (incumbent). The
incumbent will be challenged by the nominated member of the other party in the general
election. The non-incumbent party selects its nominee by conducting a primary election.
Without loss of generality, we assume that incumbent belongs to the Republican party;
thus, it is the Democratic party that holds a primary election to select its nominee for
the general election. Moreover, there are two Democratic party candidates j = A,B
who compete in the primary. For a candidate j, winning the office involves the defeat
of the other Democrat in the primary and the defeat of the Republican incumbent in
the general election. The position of the incumbent, R, is known because he has already
served one term prior to the current election.4
Each Democratic candidate j = A,B is equally likely to be liberal tj = L or moderate
tj = M . A candidate’s ideology (type) determines his sincere political beliefs; it is innate
and is known only by the candidate.5 We assume that mDem ≤ L < M ≤ E [mPop] ≤ R
where mDem denotes the ideal point of median Democrat.6 The median Democrat has a
4In section 6.2 we consider the extension of this model, in which both parties hold primary elections
and the ideologies of the candidates of both parties are unknown.
5Section 6 presents an extension of this model, in which candidates’ types are drawn from a continuous
distribution.
6The assumption that mDem ≤ L is not crucial, as a liberal candidate can be more left-wing than the
median Democrat. What is important is that a candidate with a liberal ideology is closer to the median
Democrat than a candidate with a moderate ideology; that is, |M −mDem| > |L−mDem|.
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known position mDem = −1
2
.7
During the primary, two Democrats compete by choosing a platform, which repre-
sents the probability distribution over positions L and M . Voters do not directly observe
the platforms chosen by the candidates, but rather observe m1 signals randomly drawn
from each candidate’s platform. Platforms represent how strongly a candidate emphasizes
positions L and M during his campaign. The more weight a candidate puts on position
L, the more he will stress issues that appeal to the base of the Democratic Party, and a
random draw from this platform is more likely to be an L signal. Correspondingly, the
more weight a candidate puts on position M , the more he will raise issues that are close
to the hearts of moderate voters and hence will sound like a moderate. It is the politician
(and his team) that decides which issues to emphasize during main speeches and which
ones to put aside.8 All voters observe signals from the primary race, but only those that
belong to the Democratic party cast their votes. The winner of the primary, determined
by the majority of votes cast, will challenge the Republican incumbent in the general
election.
During the general election, the challenger chooses a (possibly different) platform
and m2 signals are randomly drawn from this platform and observed by voters. As before,
the number of signals m2 is an exogenously determined parameter which measures the
intensity of the general election: a higher m2 means a higher intensity of the general
election. All voters cast a vote in the general election. The winner of the general election,
determined by the preferences of the median voter mPop, implements his preferred policy.
The platform of candidate j with type tj in the primary race is denoted by platt
j
1 and
the platform of the challenger in the general election is denoted by platt
j
2 . We will use
the following shortcut (1 − w,w) to denote the platform with weight 1 − w on position
L and the weight w on position M .
Candidates are policy-motivated just like voters. A candidate with type t gets utility
of −|t − p| if policy p is implemented. In addition, each candidate incurs the cost of
misrepresenting his true ideology every time he does so. Specifically, we assume that a
candidate j with type tj = L (tj = M) that runs on a platform (1− w,w) pays the cost
of wc ((1 − w)c) where c ∈ N and c ≥ 2. So, a candidate who puts all the weight on
his true position pays no costs, while a candidate who misrepresents his type completely
pays the cost of 1.9 Figure 1 summarizes graphically the topography of the electoral
7This assumption guarantees that the results of the primary election provide no information about
the location of the median voter in the general election.
8For instance, in the primary campaign of 2008, President Obama expressed the firm intention of
renegotiating NAFTA. However, there was not much talk about that issue during the general election
campaign. Why is that? Presumably, the topic of NAFTA regulations is of greater concern to the
Democratic base, which is the decisive force in the primary, than to the moderate voters during the
general election.
9Such costs may arise due to the costly action required by constructing a coherent platform that
stresses issues that are not the candidates’ priorities and contradict his previous statements (actions).
See also Banks (1990) and Calander-Wilkie (2007) who use costs of lying to study electoral competition
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game we study in this paper.
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Figure 1: Political Spectrum
Order of moves:
1. Information stage
Each Democratic candidate j = A,B privately learns his ideological type.
2. Primary stage
(a) Democratic candidates choose their platforms: platt
j
1 for j = A,B.
(b) All voters observe m1 signals drawn from candidates’ platforms and form be-
liefs about candidates’ true ideologies.
(c) Voters that belong to the Democratic party vote for one of the candidates.
The nominee, determined by the preferences of the median Democrat mDem,
continues the race in the next stage and will henceforth be called the chal-
lenger.
3. General election stage
(a) The challenger chooses a platform to run on in the general election: platt
j
2 .
(b) All voters observe m2 random signals drawn from the challenger’s platform
and update their beliefs about his true ideology.
(c) All voters cast a ballot for either the challenger or the incumbent. The winner
is determined by the preferences of the median voter mPop.
4. Implementation stage
The elected official implements his preferred policy, and payoffs are determined.
in one-stage elections. While Banks and Calander-Wilkie assume that only the winning candidate bears
the costs of the contradiction between ”what candidate said” and ”what candidate did”, the current
paper assumes that these costs incurred by all candidates who misrepresent their true ideology, as in an
all-pay auction.
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This electoral game is characterized by the following set of exogenous parameters:
(m1,m2) represent the intensities of the primary and the general election stages; c is the
parameter of the cost function of the candidates; L, M , and R capture the candidates’
spatial locations (ideologies); and, finally, a reflects the uncertainty about the general-
election median voter.
Before launching into formal treatment of the model, we note that the concept of
intensity of elections has been largely ignored in theoretical models of spatial competition.
Eempirical studies, however, often control for the intensity of elections. In this paper we
take the first step in incorporating the concept of election intensity into the equilibrium
model of elections. We treat intensity as an exogenous characteristic of a race. A few
examples of campaign aspects that cannot be easily manipulated by the candidates are:
the capacity of voters to absorb information, how much time and resources voters decide
to devote to a particular race and the media coverage of a race. These are the aspects
of a race that we call intensity of a race. Our main question is how intensity affects the
positioning of candidates in equilibrium.10
2.1 Equilibrium Concept
To analyze the outcomes of electoral game we will use the standard solution concept of
sequential equilibrium developed by Kreps-Wilson (1982). We focus on symmetric se-
quential equilibria, in which candidates with the same ideology employ the same strategy
at each stage of the game. The objects of symmetric sequential equilibrium are: (1) the
strategy of each type of candidate in the primary stage (platL1 , plat
M
1 ), (2) the strategy
of the challenger in the general election stage (platL2 , plat
M
2 ), (3) the system of beliefs of
voters, and (4) the voting behavior at each stage. After every history, the strategies of
each type of candidate and of voters are sequentially rational, given the system of beliefs
and the beliefs are consistent with the strategy profile. Voters are forward-looking and
use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs about candidates’ ideologies. A voter that has a
strict preference for one of the candidates necessarily votes for him, while a voter who is
indifferent randomizes equally between the two candidates. Abstention is not allowed.
3 Pandering equilibrium
In this section we present the main result of the paper: a pandering equilibrium (PE ),
in which candidates pander to the median Democrat during primaries and shift to the
center during general elections. The driving force behind this result is the need to appeal
to populations with different preferences in the primary than in the general election, with
the median Democrat located to the left of the median general-election voter.
10There are, of course, other aspects of a race which are controlled by candidates such as number of
TV ads. We leave the question of what happens when the candidates can influence intensity for a future
research.
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Theorem 1 . Consider a two-stage electoral game in which mDem = −1
2
≤ L < M ≤
E
[
mPop
]
= 0 ≤ R and −2a−L < R < 2a−M . If the intensity of a primary is sufficiently
low (m1 < c) and uncertainty about the general election is sufficiently high (a > a
?), then
there exists a pandering equilibrium (PE) of the game which has the following properties.
In the primary stage, liberal and moderate candidates play platL1 = (1, 0) and plat
M
1 =
(y, 1−y), respectively, where y ∈ (0, 1). After observing m1 messages from the candidates’
platforms, voters update their beliefs regarding the candidates’ ideologies:
pj1 = Pr[t
j = M ] =
{ ym1
ym1+1
if all messages were L
1 if at least one message was M
If both candidate have the same posterior beliefs then each candidate has an equal prob-
ability of winning the primary, whereas if pj1 ∈ (0, 1) and pk1 = 1, then candidate j wins
the primary. In the general election stage, a moderate challenger plays platM2 = (0, 1),
while the behavior of a liberal challenger depends on the intensity of the general election:
if m2 < c then plat
L
2 = (1− x, x) where x ∈ (0, 1), otherwise platL2 = (1, 0).
There are two conditions that guarantee the existence of the PE. The first one, m1 < c,
ensures that a moderate candidate finds it worthwhile to mimic a liberal ideology in the
primary by putting some positive weight on the L position. The second condition, a > a?,
ensures that the median Democrat supports a more liberal candidate over a less liberal
one in the primary election. We now present the main steps of the solution (the detailed
proofs are in Appendix A).11
3.1 Behavior of voters in the general election
Preferences of the median voter mPop determine the winner of the general election. We
denote by p2 the probability that voters believe challenger has type M after observing
m2 messages from his platform and by f(p2) the probability of such a challenger to beat
the incumbent. Using the assumption about uncertain location of mPop we derive:
f(p2) = f0 + f1 · p2 where f0 = R + L+ 2a
4a
and f1 =
M − L
4a
The condition −2a − L < R < 2a − M guarantees that the result of the general
election is never a certain event no matter how much information was revealed during
the election process. The condition M > L guarantees that the function f(p2) is strictly
increasing in p2. That is, a challenger with a higher chance of being a moderate (i.e., the
one that is closer to the E
[
mPop
]
) has a higher chance of winning the general election.
11The PE is unique if the intensity of the general election is sufficiently high (m2 ≥ c). When m2 < c,
however, both types have an incentive to keep their identities hidden in the primary: the moderate
candidate does so because he wants to increase his chance of winning the primary; the liberal candidate
does so in order to enjoy a higher chance of winning the general election in the event that he wins the
primary and then successfully mimics a moderate candidate in the general election. Thus, for some
parameters of the game there exists an equilibrium in which both types mix in the primary.
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The uncertainty parameter a determines the slope of f(p2): as a increases, the slope
decreases.12 Finally, the ideology of the incumbent R shifts the function f(p2) up and
down: the more conservative R is, the higher the chance that a liberal challenger that
has revealed his type wins the general election.
3.2 Behavior of candidates in the general election
The behavior of a challenger in the general election depends on the voters’ beliefs about
his type after the primary campaign.
Lemma 1. If voters are certain about challenger’s type after the primary campaign
or if the intensity of the general election is sufficiently high (m2 ≥ c) then the unique
continuation strategy of a challenger consistent with the equilibrium is platM2 = (0, 1) and
platL2 = (1, 0). If voters are uncertain about challenger’s type, p1 = Pr[t
challenger = M ] ∈
(0, 1) and the intensity of the general election is sufficiently low (m2 < c), then the unique
continuation strategy of a challenger consistent with the equilibrium is platM2 = (0, 1) and
platL2 = (1− x, x) where x is determined by
xc−m2 =
m2
c
· (R− L)(M − L)
4a
· p1
p1 + (1− p1)xm2 (1)
Corollary 1. If m2 < c then x(p1) is an increasing function of p1.
That is, a “shift to the center” by a liberal challenger in the general election is bigger
when voters believe that he is more likely to actually be a moderate. To intuit this result,
consider a liberal challenger who won the primary with a very small p1. In this case,
voters are fairly confident that the challenger is a liberal. This challenger will have a hard
time convincing voters that he is actually a moderate. Given that misrepresentation is
costly, such a challenger will pander less towards the position of the general election
median voter. This result highlights the danger of an early resolution of uncertainty in
the primary. After an intense primary, a liberal challenger panders less to the general
election median and as a result wins less often.
3.3 Behavior of voters in the primary election
Lemma 2. If a > −M+L
2
then if pj1 ∈ (0, 1) and pk1 = 1 then candidate j wins the
primary.
12If the location of a median voter in general election is relatively uncertain, liberal and moderate
challengers have similar chances of winning the office. On the other hand, if the location of a median
voter is more or less known, a small increase in the degree to which voters believe that the challenger
has a moderate ideology (p2) makes a significant difference in terms of his probability of winning.
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Put in words, the more liberal candidate wins the primary. The main trade-off that
voters face in a two-stage election is the need to weigh two factors: what they believe the
candidate’s ideology is, and his chances of winning the general election. When uncertainty
about mPop is sufficiently high, the second consideration becomes less important, because
the probability of winning the general election function f(p2) is relatively flat.
3.4 Behavior of candidates in the primary stage
Lemma 3. If a > a? and m1 < c, then there exists a unique y ∈ (0, 1) such that
platL1 = (1, 0), and plat
M
1 = (y, 1 − y) is the optimal behavior of candidates in the
primary,13 where
a? =
{
R−M
2
− M−L
2
if R > M − 2L
−M+L
2
if R ≤M − 2L (2)
A sufficiently low intensity in the primary is a necessary condition for pandering in the
primary: if, on the contrary, m1 ≥ c then a moderate candidate prefers to reveal his true
type during the primary campaign. As we have shown in section 3.2, the behavior of a
liberal challenger in the general election depends on the intensity of the general election.
Therefore, we distinguish two cases:
• When the intensity of the general election is sufficiently high (m2 ≥ c), there
exists a PE such that, in the primary stage, candidates play platL1 = (1, 0) and
platM1 = (y, 1− y) where
c
m1
yc−m1 =
f0(M − L) + f1(R−M)
4
(3)
and in the general election both types of a challenger separate.
• When the intensity of the general election stage is sufficiently low (m2 < c), there
exists a PE such that, in the primary stage, candidates play platL1 = (1, 0) and
platM1 = (y, 1−y), and in the general election stage a challenger plays platM2 = (0, 1)
and platL2 = (1− x, x), where (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) are determined by the system
below: {
c
m1
yc−m1 = f0(M−L)
4
+ f1
4
· (R−M)(ym1−2xm2 )+(R−L)xm2ym1
xm2+ym1
c
m2
xc−m2 = (R−L)(M−L)
4a
· ym1
ym1+xm2
(4)
To summarize, the behavior of candidates in the PE is consistent with the post-
primary moderation effect : candidates cater to the median of the party in the primary
campaign and once the nomination is secured, they moderate their platforms during the
general election.
13Notice that a? > − 12 , which means that if we restrict the values of the uncertainty parameter a to
be in the region a ∈ (− 12 , a?) then naturally general-election median is always located to the right of
the democratic median.
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4 Comparative statics
In this section we study how the behavior of candidates in the PE changes with changes
in primary and general-election intensities.
Theorem 2. Consider m2 < c. If m2 ↑ then y ↑ and xm2 ↓.
Higher intensity in the general election race has two effects: (1) a moderate candidate
is more willing to lie in the primary campaign and (2) a liberal challenger is more often
revealed to be a liberal in the general election stage. The intuition behind these effects
is as follows. Since voters observe more signals in a high-intensity general election, a
liberal challenger is likely to send at least one L signal, revealing that he is a liberal.
A moderate challenger, who never sends an L message, therefore has a better chance of
winning a high-intensity general election. Anticipating the higher likelihood of winning
the general election, a moderate candidate will be willing to mimic liberal behavior to a
higher extent and incur more costs at the primary stage to win nomination. For m2 ≥ c,
both types of a challenger separate in the general election, so a change in m2 does not
impact the primary-stage behavior in the PE.
Theorem 3. Consider m1 < c. If c ≤ m2 then m1 ↑ ⇒ ym1 ↓. If m2 < c then m1 ↑
⇒ ym1 ↓ and also x ↓.
The higher the intensity of the primary, the harder it is for a moderate candidate to
mimic a liberal during that primary. As the number of signals increases, it becomes more
likely that an M message will emerge and reveal the moderate’s true ideology to primary
voters. Moreover, after a high-intensity primary, a liberal challenger will engage in less
mimicry of a moderate ideology in the general-election stage (see Corollary 1).
Corollary 2. “Divisive Primary Effect.” Intense primaries decrease the chances
of Democrats to win the election.
A negative relationship between an intense primary and the chances of Democratic
candidates to win a general election follows directly from Theorem 3 and Corollary 1.
Intense primaries decrease the chances of a moderate Democrat to win the nomination
as well as the chances of a liberal challenger to win the general election. Both effects are
detrimental to the Democratic party.
5 Welfare of the Democrats
The intensity of the primary race affects not only the chances of Democrats to win the
election but also the welfare of Democrats. To define the welfare of Democrats, we need to
specify the distribution of ideal points of voters that belong to the Democratic Party. To
make things simple, we assume that registered Democrats have ideal points distributed
uniformly over the interval of [−1, 0], which is consistent with the position of median
10
Democrat we assumed so far, mDem = −1
2
. We denote by WDem(p) the welfare of the
Democratic Party when policy p is implemented and by E
[
WDem
]
the overall welfare of
Democrats where the expectation is taken over the implemented policies. Then
E
[
WDem
]
= Pr[L wins] ·WDem(L) + Pr[M wins] ·WDem(M) + Pr[R wins] ·WDem(R)
WDem(p) = −
∫ 0
−1
|zi − p|dzi for p ∈ {L,M,R}
The welfare of Democrats is the highest when a liberal candidate wins the election
and the lowest when an incumbent wins: WDem(L) > WDem(M) ≥ WDem(R), where
the last equality holds only if M = R = E
[
mPop
]
. Theorem 4 shows that the expected
welfare of Democrats can increase or decrease with primary intensity depending on the
ideology of the incumbent.
Theorem 4. Consider m2 ≥ c. Then,
m1 ↑⇒
[
E
[
WDem
] ↑ if and only if R < R?
E
[
WDem
] ↓ if and only if R > R?
where R? = min{0, −L2−2a(1+L+M)−L(1+M)−M(1+M)
L+M
}.
The welfare of Democrats is determined by a balance of two countervailing effects. On
the one hand, intense primaries increase the probability that incumbents win the general
election, which is naturally to the detriment of Democrats. On the other hand, liberal
candidates tend to win intense primaries more often, which is the best possible outcome
for Democrats. When the incumbent is relatively moderate (R < R?), the latter positive
effect outweighs the former negative one. When the incumbent is very conservative
(R > R?), however, the negative effect dominates the positive one and Democrats suffer
from an intense primary.
6 Discussion and Extensions
6.1 Further implications of the model
Flip-flopping behavior of candidates in two-stage elections implies that for a given candi-
date there is a negative correlation between his chances of winning the primary and his
chances of winning the general election. Maisel and Stone (1998) use the data from the
Potential Candidate Survey to show that prospective politicians who consider running
for the House are aware of this relation (Table 1). 56% of candidates who believe to
have a high chance of winning the general election estimate their chances of winning the
nomination as unlikely, compared to 26% of candidates who have a low chances in the
general election. Similarly, 50% of the candidates who are pessimistic about the general
election believe they are likely to win nomination compared to 24% of candidates who
are optimistic about the general election stage.
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Prob to win the general election
Prob to win the primary Low High
Unlikely 26% 56%
Toss-up 24% 21%
Likely 50% 24%
# of obs. 108 obs. 102 obs.
Table 1: Beliefs of the Potential Candidates (Maisel-Stone (1998)).
The second implication of the model relates the intensity of the primary and general
election stages to the selection of candidates. Controlling for the intensity of the general
election, we expect districts with an intense nomination process to elect more extreme
legislators on average. Further, controlling for the intensity of the primary races, we
expect districts with an intense general election stage to elect legislators who are more
moderate on average. These two hypotheses are straightforward implications of the
comparative statics results discussed in section 4.
6.2 Both parties hold primary elections
In this section we extend the model to allow both parties to hold primaries and show
that the post-primary moderation and intense primary effects hold true in this case
as well. To focus attention on the two primaries, we consider the extension of the basic
model with a relatively intense general election (m2 ≥ c) and symmetric ideological types
of Democratic and Republican candidates around the expected median general-election
voter. We allow the two primaries to have different intensities (mD1 ,m
R
1 ) and characterize
the unique equilibrium of this game.
Theorem 5. If a > a¯ and m2 > c > max{mD1 ,mR1 } then there exists a unique equi-
librium of the two-stage election game with both parties holding simultaneous primaries,
in which in the primary candidates with extreme ideological types play the truth and mod-
erate candidates mimic them partially. The voters elect a more extreme candidate in both
primaries. All types separate in the general election race.
Corollary 3. Probability that Republicans (Democrats) win election decreases with
the intensity of the Republican (Democratic) primary.
Theorem 5 and Corollary 3 demonstrate the robustness of the main results of the
model: moderate candidates cater to their party’s base during the primary only to move
to the center once they secure the nomination and an intense primary hurts the chances
of the party engaged in it to win the election, which in turn helps the opposing party.
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6.3 Candidates with Continuous Policy Types
In this section we present an extension of the model with a continuous policy space and
show that the movement in platforms between the primary and general election persist.
We consider the following modified version of the electoral game. A policy space is
the closed interval P = [−1, 1]. There is a continuum of voters with Euclidean policy
preferences on P . A voter with ideal point zi obtains utility u(zi, p) = −|zi − p| if policy
p is implemented. The location of the median voter is uncertain:
mPop ∼ U [−a, a] where a > 0⇒ E [mPop] = 0
The election consists of two stages: the Democratic primary that determines the
Democratic nominee and the general election stage, in which the nominee challenges the
Republican incumbent. Voters with ideal points zi ∈ [−1, 0] belong to the Democratic
Party and, thus, participate both in the primary and in the general election. Voters
with ideal points zi ∈ (0, 1] belong to the Republican Party and vote only once in the
general election stage. However, they observe what happens in the Democratic primary
and, thus, form the same beliefs about candidates as do the voters from the Democratic
Party. The median Democrat is located at mDem = −1
2
.
There are two candidates that belong to the Democratic Party, A and B, who compete
in the primary election for the right to proceed to the general election. Each candidate j
has a ”type” tj which represents a policy position that he/she will implement if elected.
The type of the Republican incumbent is known: R ∈ [0, 1]. The types of Democratic
candidates are assumed to be independent and identically distributed random variables
according to the continuous uniform distribution
for j ∈ {A,B} ⇒ tj ∼ U [mDem, EmPop]
In the primary election, each candidate j sends a message sj, which is publicly ob-
served by all voters: sj :
[
mDem, EmPop
] → [mDem, EmPop]. Based on the observed
messages, the voters update their priors about candidates’ types and the voters that
belong to the Democratic Party vote for one of the candidates. The winner, determined
by the majority of votes, proceeds to the general election stage, in which the true type
of a challenger is revealed and he faces the incumbent with type R. This is an analog
of the “intense” general election stage as we refer to it in the base model. Given the
assumptions about the uncertainty of the mPop, a challenger with type t wins general
election with probability
f(t) = f0 + f1 · t = R + 2a
4a
+
1
4a
· t where
{
f(−1
2
) > 0
f(0) < 1
Candidates care about winning the elections.14 A candidate who wins the election
gets utility normalized to 1. In addition, if a candidate lies in the primary stage he incurs
14The version of the electoral game with office-motivated candidates and binary space is very similar
to the model studied in this paper. We omit this extension for brevity (available from the author upon
request).
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costs of lying. The costs of lying are parameterized as follows: a candidate with true
type tj who sends message m during the primary stage pays the cost of c · |tj −m| where
0 < c < c¯. The upper bound c¯ = 2 · f (−1
2
)
ensures that some types of candidates will
pool with the other types during the primary. If c ≥ c¯ then the only equilibrium in
this game is the one in which all types reveal their true identity in the primary election
(situation similar to m1 ≥ c in the base model).
The expected utility of a candidate j with type tj that announced m in the primary
is
EU(tj)|m = λ(tj) · f(tj)− c · |tj −m|
where λ(tj) denotes the probability of type tj to win the primary race.
Theorem 6. If the uncertainty about mPop is sufficiently high (a ≥ 1
6
) and the cost of
lying is sufficiently low (c < f0) then there exists an uninformative symmetric sequential
equilibrium of the electoral game, in which all types of candidates announce m = mDem
in the primary. If voters observe message m = mDem they do not update their prior
belief regarding candidate’s type, however, if voters observe out-of-equilibrium message
m′ ∈ (−1
2
, 0] then they believe it was sent by candidate with type tj = 0.
Theorem 7. If the uncertainty about mPop is sufficiently high (a ≥ 1
2
) and the costs
of lying are not too high (f(0) < c < 2f
(−1
2
)
) then there exists a partially informative
symmetric sequential equilibrium of the electoral game, in which the candidates with types
tj ∈ [−1
2
, p
]
pool together by announcing m = mDem and the candidates with types
tj ∈ (p, 0] separate and play s(tj) ≤ tj, where
p =
1− 2R− 4a+√(4a+ 2R− 1)2 − 8(4ac−R− 2a)
4
and s(tj) =
2tj
c
· f(tj)
If voters observe m = −1
2
then they believe this message comes from a candidate with
type t ∈ [−1
2
, p
]
, if voters observe m = s(t) for t ∈ (p, 0] they infer the precise type of
a candidate and if voters observe out-of-equilibrium message m ∈ (−1
2
, s(p)
)
then they
believe this message was sent by the candidate with type p. A candidate whose expected
type is closer to the ideal policy of mDem wins the nomination.
7 Related literature
The model presented here belongs to the literature that studies information transmission
through electoral competition. The first such model is Banks (1990) who showed that
if costs of lying are above critical value, then in equilibrium extreme candidates are
willing to reveal their true type, while moderate candidates pool together. Callander-
Wilkie (2007) extend Banks’s model to allow candidates to have heterogeneous costs of
lying and find that, although liars are favored in the elections, the honest types are not
always defeated. Kartik-McAfee (2007) study a related situation, in which a fraction of
candidates have a ”character” and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform.
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Finally, Bernhardt-Ingberman (1985) model costly movements of candidates by assuming
that candidates are tied to their reputations. Ours is also a signaling model. However, we
depart from the above models in that we study two-stage elections, in which candidates
face electorates with different preferences in the primary and in the general election. This
crucial difference raises the natural question of how much information about candidates’
true ideologies is revealed in two-stage elections.
There are several papers that study how primary races affect the selection of candi-
dates. Coleman (1972) and Owen-Grofman (2006) discuss the polarizing effect of primary
elections when candidates are constrained to offer the same ideological position in the
general election as they have in the primary. Callander (2007) investigates momentum in
voting behavior and the emergence of bandwagons. Adams-Merrill (2008) demonstrate
that candidates who have stronger campaign abilities are elected in primaries. Alesina-
Holden (2008) and Meirowitz (2005) emphasize the advantage of remaining ambiguous
in the primary election. In particular, in Meirowitz model candidates benefit from re-
maining ambiguous about their policy platform during the primary election because the
primary reveals information about preferences of the voters. In the equilibrium, can-
didates converge to the center between the primary and the general election, although
the convergence is in the sense that they are ambiguous in the primary and precise in
the general election. Hirano-Snyder-Ting (2009) consider a model of distributive politics
and show that when the nominee of the party is elected through a primary election,
core voters receive positive transfers, whereas they receive nothing when only the general
election matters. The flavor of this result is similar to the equilibrium strategy of our
candidates in the primary election. However, our paper differs from Hirano et al. in
many aspects, including the main focus: we investigate information transmission and the
selection of candidates in two-stage elections with policy-motivated candidates, whereas
Hirano et al. study the effect of primary elections on the distribution of public resources
with office-motivated candidates.
In the recent paper Hummel (2010) presents formal model of two-stage election, in
which voters dislike when candidates change their positions between primaries and gen-
eral elections. One of the results of Hummel paper is similar to the one obtained here:
there exists an equilibrium in which candidates choose more extreme positions in the
primary and move towards center in the general election, where the extent to which can-
didates moderate their position depends on the costs of flip-flopping. However, there are
several important differences between current paper and that of Hummel both in terms
of model specifications and, more importantly, obtained results. First, in Hummel as
in many other models of primaries, primaries turn out to be uninteresting in the sense
that in the equilibrium, symmetric ex-ante primary candidates are indistinguishable (all
liberal candidates choose the same position in the liberal primaries, while all conserva-
tive candidates choose the same position in the conservative primary). In our model,
candidate are symmetric as well; ex-ante each candidate is equally likely to be liberal or
moderate. In spite of that, primaries are full of action, as different sequences of signals
are observed from different candidates during the primary campaign. Second, the model
developed in this paper provides a unified explanation for both flip-flopping behavior
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of candidates and divisive-primary effect and shows that both effects originate from the
similar trade-offs.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a signaling model of two-stage elections in which candidates
must obtain their party’s nomination before competing in the general election. Candi-
dates are policy-motivated and can choose different campaign platforms in every stage
of the election. A candidate who misrepresents his true type incurs costs (of lying). We
allow different stages of the election to have different intensities, measured by the num-
ber of signals observed by voters from the candidates’ platforms, and demonstrate that
intensities play an important role in the selection process of candidates.
This model provides a unified framework that allows us to examine two commonly
observed patterns about primaries: (1) the “post-primary moderation effect,” in which
candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center once the
nomination is secured and (2) the “divisive-primary effect,” which refers to the detrimen-
tal effect of intense primaries on a party’s general-election prospects.
We finish by noting that the timing of information revelation is important in two-
stage elections, as it affects who gets elected, which policies are implemented, and the
welfare of the voters. For example, intense primaries might be dangerous for the party
in the sense that they reveal too much information about their candidates too early,
and this then hurts the party’s chances of winning general elections. Depending on the
incumbent’s ideology, intense primaries may or may not be beneficial for the welfare of
the party, since intense primaries filter out moderate candidates during the nomination
process.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Characterization of Pandering Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 1
If m2 ≥ c then both types are happy to separate in the general election. Consider
m2 < c. The only interesting case to consider is p1 ∈ (0, 1). First we show that if
platM2 = (0, 1) and plat
L
2 = (1− x, x) where x is as specified in (1) then no type wants to
deviate. Assume both types of a challenger follow this strategy. If voters observe only M
messages in the general election then they update challenger’s type as p2 = Pr[t
challenger =
M ] = p1
p1+(1−p1)xm2 and if at least one message is L then p2 = Pr[t
challenger = M ] = 0. A
moderate challenger is clearly happy to play platM2 = (0, 1) because f(p2) is increasing
in p2. To find optimal platform of liberal challenger assume that instead of playing
platL2 = (1−x, x) he plays platL2 = (1−w,w) and characterize the best response function
w∗(x) for every x ∈ (0, 1):
w∗(x) =
(
(R− L)m2f1p2
c
) 1
c−m2
Function w∗(x) is strictly decreasing, continuous and always positive on x ∈ (0, 1) with
lim
x→0
w∗(x) > lim
x→1
w∗(x). Thus, there exists a unique x ∈ (0, 1) such that w∗(x) = x which
satisfies (1). It is easy to check that L type prefer to play this strategy rather than
platL2 = (1, 0).
To show that full separation cannot be equilibrium in the general election stage, assume,
by contradiction, that it is and consider expected utility of a liberal challenger that plays
platL2 = (1− w,w)
EU
(L,L)
(1−w,w)|p1∈(0,1) = −wc − (R− L)[1− f0] + (R− L)[f1wm2 + p2f1(1− wm2 − (1− w)m2)]
∂
∂w
= −cwc−1 +m2wm2−1 · f1(R− L) + (R− L)f1p2 · (−m2wm2−1 +m2(1− w)m2−1)
where voters assign belief p2 to a challenger that sends a mixture of signals M and L. To
support separation, it must be that ∂
∂w
≤ 0 for all w ∈ (0, 1). If separation cannot be
supported for p2 = Pr[t
challenger = M ] = 1 then it can’t for any p2 < 1:
∂
∂w
= −cwc−1 +m2(1− w)m2−1 · (R− L)f1
Function ∂
∂w
is continuous in w ∈ [0, 1], limw→0 ∂∂w = f1(R − L) > 0 and limw→1 ∂∂w =−c < 0. Thus, ∃w¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂
∂w
|w¯ > 0, which shows that separation in the
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general election is not part of the equilibrium strategy for m2 < c. It is straightforward
to check that any other configuration of the strategies is not part of the equilibrium in
the general election stage, q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 1
Use Implicit Function Theorem to determine the sign of ∂x(p1)
∂p1
:
F (x, p1) = −x+
(
m2(R− L)f1p1
c(p1 + (1− p1)xm2)
) 1
c−m2
∂F (x, p1)
∂x
= −1− 1
c−m2
(
m2(R− L)f1p1
c(p1 + (1− p1)xm2)
) 1
c−m2−1 · m2(R− L)f1p1
c
· (1− p1)m2x
m2−1
(p1 + (1− p1)xm2)2 < 0
∂F (x, p1)
∂p1
=
1
c−m2
(
m2(R− L)f1p1
c(p1 + (1− p1)xm2)
) 1
c−m2−1 · m2(R− L)f1
c
· x
m2
(p1 + (1− p1)xm2)2 > 0
∂x(p1)
∂p1
= −
∂F (x,p1)
∂p1
∂F (x,p1)
∂x
> 0
q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 2
Denote by Eu(zi, p
j
1) expected utility of voter zi if candidate j with posterior belief
pj1 = Pr[t
j = M ] wins the nomination and behaves optimally in the general election
stage. Then
if pj1 = 1 then Eu(zi, 1) = (f0 + f1) (− |zi −M |) + (1− f0 − f1) (− |zi −R|)
if pj1 = 0 then Eu(zi, 0) = f0 (− |zi − L|) + (1− f0) (− |zi −R|)
if pj1 ∈ (0, 1) and m2 ≥ c then Eu(zi, pj1) = (1− pj1) · Eu(zi, 0) + pj1 · Eu(zi, 1)
if pj1 ∈ (0, 1) and m2 < c then Eu(zi, pj1) = (1− pj1) (1− xm2) · Eu(zi, 0) +
(
pj1 + (1− pj1)xm2
) · Eu(zi, pj2)
where
Eu(zi, p
j
2) =
(
f0 + f1p
j
2
) (− ∣∣zi − pj2M − (1− pj2)L∣∣)+ (1− f0 − f1pj2)(− |zi −R|)
and pj2 =
pj1
pj1 + (1− pj1)xm2
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Consider two candidates with posterior beliefs pj1 = Pr[t
j = M ] ∈ (0, 1) and pk1 =
Pr[tk = M ] = 1. Then all voters with zi ∈ [−1,−12 ] support candidate j if and only if
Eu(zi, p
j
1) > Eu(zi, p
k
1). Using algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that if a > −M+L2
then the last inequality holds true, q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Assume there exists a PE of the dynamic election game, in which candidates play platL1 =
(1, 0) and platM1 = (y, 1−y). Say that candidate A plays equilibrium strategies. Consider
what candidate B wants to play. The expected utility of liberal candidate B when he
puts weight 1− z on position M is
−(1−z)c+EU (L,L)p1∈(0,1)·
2 + 2zm1 − zm1ym1
4
+EU
(L,M)
p1∈(0,1)·
2ym1 − zm1ym1
4
+EU
(L,M)
p1=1
·(1− y
m1)(1− zm1)
2
where EU
(k,j)
pj1
denotes the expected utility of type k when type j wins the nomination
and behaves optimally in the general election stage for a given belief pj1 = Pr[t
j = M ] of
the voters after the primary.
Liberal candidate B will play platL1 = (1, 0) if and only if
∂
∂z
> 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1):
∂
∂z
= c(1− z)c−1 +m1zm1−1 ·
[
2− ym1
4
EU
(L,L)
p1∈(0,1) −
ym1
4
EU
(L,M)
p1∈(0,1) −
1− ym1
2
EU
(L,M)
p1=1
]
where
EU
(L,L)
p1∈(0,1) = −(R− L)(1− f0 − f1p2xm2)
EU
(L,M)
p1∈(0,1) = −(R− L)(1− f0 − f1p2)− (M − L)(f0 + f1p2)
EU
(L,M)
p1=1
= −(R− L)(1− f0 − f1)− (M − L)(f0 + f1)
Condition a > −M+L
2
guarantees that EU
(L,L)
p1∈(0,1) > EU
(L,M)
p1=1
> EU
(L,M)
p1∈(0,1) ⇒ ∂∂z > 0 for
all z ∈ [0, 1).
Consider now moderate candidate B. His expected utility from playing platt
B=L
1 = (w, 1−
w) is
−wc+(1− w
m1)(1− ym1)
2
·EU (M,M)p1=1 +
2− wm1
4
·EU (M,L)p1∈(0,1)+
3wm1 + 2ym1 − 2ym1wm1
4
·EU (M,M)p1∈(0,1)
where
EU
(M,L)
p1∈(0,1) = −(R−M)(1− f0 − xm2f1p2)− (M − L)(f0 + xm2f1p2)
EU
(M,M)
p1∈(0,1) = −(R−M)(1− f0 − f1p2)
EU
(M,M)
p1=1
= −(R−M)(1− f0 − f1)
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The best response of tB = M when tA = M plays platt
A=M
1 = (y, 1− y) is
w?(y) =
[
m1
c
(
3− 2ym1
4
EU
(M,M)
p1∈(0,1) −
1− ym1
2
EU
(M,M)
p1=1
− 1
4
EU
(M,L)
p1∈(0,1)
)] 1
c−m1
To show that there exists a unique y ∈ (0, 1) such that [w?(y)]c−m1 = yc−m1 notice
that (a) function s(y) = yc−m1 is continuous and strictly increasing on y ∈ (0, 1) with
s(0) = 0 < 1 = s(1), (b) function g(y) = (w?(y))c−m1 is increasing and convex in
y ∈ (0, 1), (c) a > a? ⇒ 0 < limy→0 g(y) < limy→1 g(y) < 1. Finally, it can be easily
checked that M type prefers to play platM1 = (y, 1 − y) rather than separate and play
platM1 = (0, 1). Thus, if a > a
? and max{m1,m2} < c then there exists a PE of
the dynamic election game in which moderate candidates in the primary pander to the
median Democrat by putting weight y on the liberal position, where y is determined as
follows
yc−m1 =
m1
c
[
f0(M − L)
4
+
f1
4
· (R−M)(y
m1 − 2xm2) + (R− L)xm2ym1
xm2 + ym1
]
If m1 < c ≤ m2 then moderate candidates play plat1 = (y, 1− y) in the primary, where
yc−m1 =
m1
c
· f1(R−M) + f0(M − L)
4
q.e.d.
9.2 Comparative Statics
We detail here the proof of Theorem 3. The proof of Theorem 2 is similar and omitted
for brevity.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider m2 < c and re-write the system that determines optimal
behavior of candidates in PE using the following notation: z = ym1 , t = xm2 , k = c
m1
and b = c
m2
: {
k · zk−1 = f0(M−L)
4
+ f1
4
· (R−M)(z−2t)+(R−L)tz
t+z
b · tb−1 = (R− L)f1 · zz+t
(5)
Then,
k
(
btb
(R− L)f1 − btb−1
)k−1
=
f0(M − L)
4
+
tbt+1 − 2f1t(R−M)
4
+
3btb(R−M)
4(R− L) (6)
Equation (6) has only one unknown - t - and we are interested in dt
dk
. Recall that we have
shown before that for m2 < c there is a unique solution (t, z) such that t ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈
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(0, 1) determined by the system above. Therefore, we must have 0 < bt
b
(R−L)f1−btb−1 < 1.
To see that dt
dk
> 0, notice that (a) LHS of equation (6) is increasing function of t, (b)
RHS of equation (6) does not depend on k, and (c) LHS decreases with an increase in
k. Thus, dt
dk
> 0 which means that m1 ↑⇒ k ↓⇒ xm2 ↓. Finally, we show that when m1
increases ym1 decreases. Use original equation that determines optimal x:
c
m2
xc−m2 = (R− L)f1 · y
m1
ym1 + xm2
xc−m2 > x¯c−m2 ⇒ (R−L)f1 · y
m1
ym1 + xm2
> (R−L)f1 · y¯
m1+1
y¯m1+1 + x¯m2
⇒ ym1x¯m2 > y¯m1+1xm2
where (x, y) is the solution of the system (5) for m1 and (x¯, y¯) is the solution of the
system (5) for m1 + 1. But x¯
m2 < xm2 therefore to make sure that last inequality holds
true, we must have ym1 > y¯m1+1, which completes the proof that m1 ↑⇒ ym1 ↓. Similar
argument can be applied to the case m2 ≥ c, q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Pr[L wins election] =
3− ym1
4
[
f0 + f1x
m2
ym1
ym1 + xm2
]
Pr[M wins election] = f0
1 + ym1
4
+ f1
xm2(1− ym1)2 + ym1(1 + ym1)
4(xm2 + ym1)
Pr[Democrat wins] = f0 +
1 + ym1
4
· f1
The last expression decreases in m1, q.e.d.
9.3 Welfare Analysis
Proof of Theorem 4
For m2 ≥ c,
Pr[R wins] = 1− f0 − f1
4
· (1 + ym1) and Pr[L wins] = 3− y
m1
4
f0
Thus, m1 ↑⇒ Pr[R wins] ↑ and Pr[L wins] ↑. This implies that m1 ↑⇒ Pr[M wins] ↓
because Pr[L wins] + Pr[M wins] + Pr[R wins] = 1.
EWDem =
[
3− ym1
4
f0
]
·WDem(L)+
[
f0 + f1
4
(1 + ym1)
]
·WDem(M)+
[
1− f0 − f1
4
· (1 + ym1)
]
·WDem(R)
The result follows immediately after algebraic manipulations with the expression for
EWDem, q.e.d.
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9.4 Both parties hold simultaneous primaries.
The policy space is P = [−1, 1]. Voters with ideal points zi ∈ [−1, 0] belong to the
Democratic party (mDem = −1
2
) and voters with ideal points zi ∈ [0, 1] belong to the
Republican party (mRep = 1
2
). The location of the median voter in general elections is
not known during the primaries: mPop ∼ U [−a, a] with a > 0. Utility of a voter i with
ideal point zi when policy p is implemented is u(zi, p) = −|zi − p|.
There are two candidates from each party who compete for the nomination. Each Demo-
cratic candidate is equally likely to have a true ideological type L or MD, while each
Republican candidate is equally likely to have a true ideological type R or MR, where
−1
2
≤ L < MD ≤ 0 ≤MR < R ≤ 1
2
where MD +MR = 0 and L+R = 0
Primaries in both parties occur simultaneously, and we allow the two primaries to have
different intensities: mD1 denotes the intensity of the Democratic primary and m
R
1 denotes
the intensity of the Republican primary. The winners of the primaries compete with each
other in the general election, the intensity of which is m2. The candidate with type t
receives the utility of −|t − p| if policy p is implemented and pays the cost of lying liec
where c ∈ N if he lies in either stage of the election. We focus on high intensity general
election with m2 ≥ c.
Given q2 = Pr[t
Rep = MR] (which represents the posterior belief that the Republican
nominee has a moderate type after the general election campaign) the probability that
the Democratic nominee wins general elections varies with his expected type captures by
belief p2 = Pr[t
Dem = MD]
f(p2)|q2 =
EtDem+EtRep
2
+ a
2a
=
2a− q2(R−MR)
4a
+
R−MR
4a
· p2 = f(0)|q2 + f1 · p2
The function f(p2)|q2 satisfies two intuitive properties: (1) the Democratic candidate that
is more likely to have a moderate type has a higher chance to win general elections and
(2) the higher q2 the lower the probability that the Democratic candidate with p2 = 0
wins the general election.15
Proof of Theorem 5. The condition m2 ≥ c ensures that all types will be separating
in the general election stage. The condition a > a¯ = R+M
R
2
guarantees that in both pri-
maries a candidate with an uncertain type wins over a candidate with definitely moderate
15This intercept f(0)|q2 works like the location of incumbent R in the basic model - parallel shift of
the probability to win generals function. The slope of this function f1 =
R−MR
4a stays the same for any
q2 ∈ [0, 1].
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type. Now we derive optimal strategy of candidates in the primary elections in each party
(using the same technique as in the basic model). Extreme candidates are happy to put
all the weight on the extreme position, while moderate types will mimic extreme behav-
ior by lying. The extent of lying depends on the intensities of both primaries (mD1 ,m
R
1 ).
Denote by x (y) the amount of lying that moderate Democrats (Republicans) are willing
to engage in during the primaries, then for any set of parameters (a, c,mD1 ,m
R
1 ,M
R, R)
there exists a unique pair (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) that solves the two equations below:
x =
(
mD1
4c
(A−B)
) 1
c−mD1
and y =
(
mR1
4c
(C −D)
) 1
c−mR1
where
• A denotes the utility of type t = MD when type t = MD wins Democratic primary
• B denotes the utility of type t = MD when type t = L wins Democratic primary
• C denotes the utility of type t = MR when type t = MR wins Republican primary
• D denotes the utility of type t = MR when type t = R wins Republican primary
The condition c > max{mD1 ,mR1 } guarantees that moderate candidates prefer to mimic
extreme candidates during the primaries rather than separate. This completes the proof
that there exists pandering equilibrium described in Theorem 5. In order to show that
pandering equilibrium characterized above is unique given the specified conditions, we
note that in any other possible configuration of strategies, an extreme type would prefer
to deviate and put all the weight on the extreme position, which guarantees that the
moderate type will always have an incentive to partially mimic extreme behavior in the
primary to increase his chances of winning the nomination, q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 3 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 and, thus, omitted for brevity.
9.5 Continuous Types of Candidates
Proof of Theorem 6
If a > 1
6
then a candidate that sends equilibrium message m = mDem = −1
2
wins primary
against a candidate that sends any other message m′ ∈ (−1
2
, 0] because ∀zi ∈
[−1,−1
2
]⇒
Eu(zi,m)|m=− 1
2
≥ Eu(zi,m′)|m′ 6=− 1
2
, where Eu(zi,m)|m=− 1
2
= zi+
3f0−f1(1+3R)
12
−R(1−f0)
and Eu(zi,m
′)|m′ 6=− 1
2
= zi −R(1− f0).
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Second, we fshow that no candidate wants to deviate from playing the equilibrium strat-
egy. That means, for all α ∈ [−1
2
, 0
]
we must have EU(α,−1
2
) ≥ EU(α,m′)|m′ 6=− 1
2
:
EU
(
α,−1
2
)
=
1
2
· (f0 + f1α)− c ·
∣∣∣∣α + 12
∣∣∣∣ = f0 + f1α2 − c ·
(
α +
1
2
)
EU(α,m′)|m′ 6=− 1
2
= 0− c · |α−m′| =
[ −c(α−m′) if α ≥ m′
−c(m′ − α) if α < m′
whihc is true if c < f1
2
≤ f0, q.e.d.
Steps of the Proof of Theorem 7
• If a > 1
2
then a more liberal candidate wins primary over the less liberal candidate
• Type p is indifferent between sending pooling message m = −1
2
and separating
• Separating types do not want to mimic each others’ strategy
• The conditions f(0) < c < 2f (−1
2
)
, a > 1
2
, f(0) < 1 and f
(−1
2
)
> 0 also guarantee
that there exists p ∈ (−1
2
, 0
)
that satisfies the definition of p
• Candidates with types α ∈ (p, 0] do not want to deviate.
• Types that pool at m = mDem don’t want to deviate.
q.e.d.
26
